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WORKERS' COMPENSATION*
By DANNY J. BASIL
INTRODUCTION
During the past year Kentucky's Workers' Compensation
program has undergone substantial legislative and judicial
changes. A number of those changes are examined below, with
greater emphasis being placed on the legislative changes. Al-
though this survey is not exhaustive, an effort has been made
to examine developments the author believes will prove most
relevant to practitioners.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
One of the major projects undertaken by the 1980 Ken-
tucky General Assembly was an extensive revision of the
Workers' Compensation Act.' The legislative changes that re-
sulted became effective on July 15, 1980.2 The high cost of
workers' compensation insurance premiums appears to have
been the primary impetus for the revision,' with the new legis-
lation requiring a twenty-seven percent reduction in premium
rates.4 Similarly, many other changes in the Act are directed
at reducing the operating cost of the program by reducing
benefits5 and requiring more restrictive application of the
* In recent legislation the reviser of statutes was directed to change the words
"workmen's compensation" to "workers' compensation" wherever they appear in the
Kentucky Revised Statutes. 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 22.
' INFORMATIONAL BULL. No. 131, LEGIS. RESEARCH COMM'N 129 (August 1979).
2 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 23.
INFORMATIONAL BULL. No. 131, LEGIS. RESEARCH COMM'N 131 (August 1979).
4 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 18. The reduced rates are to remain in effect for at
least one year. The Commissioner of Insurance was given authority to call for a public
hearing to determine an appropriate rate level in the event that an intervening statu-
tory change should cause the reduced "rates to be inadequate as defined under Chap-
ter 304 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes." 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 18.
5 One major benefit reduction is the newly imposed limit of 425 weeks that was
placed on benefits for permanent partial disability. Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.730(1)(b)
(Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Prior to this change, certain permanent par-
tial disabilities benefits continued for the duration of the disability. The elimination
of the Pennington Doctrine (see notes 26-33 infra and accompanying text for a thor-
ough discussion) will also lead to major benefit reductions. Id.
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Act.6 To the extent that legislative intent is relevant, this goal
of reducing expenses should be considered in interpreting the
revised statutes.
A. Liberal vs. Strict Construction
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 342.0047 was
repealed by the 1980 General Assembly. The repeal of this
section, which required that the Act be liberally construed,
would appear to be an alarming change. KRS section 342.004
provided, in part, that "[t]his chapter shall be liberally con-
strued on questions of law, as distinguished from evidence,
and the rule of law requiring strict construction of statutes in
abrogation of the common law shall not apply to the chap-
ter."8 This provision had been frequently cited by the Work-
ers' Compensation Board and the courts' and was often used
to resolve doubts in favor of claimants. 10
6 It would appear that the repeal of KRS § 342.004, which had required a "lib-
eral construction" of the Act, might lead to more restrictive interpretations. 1980 Ky.
Acts, ch. 104, § 24. Furthermore, "injury," as defined in KRS § 342.620(1) (1980),
must now "arise out of and in the course of employment," as well as be "work re-
lated." 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 24. Each of these revisions would seem to indicate a
trend toward requiring more restrictive applications of the Act. As will be seen, how-
ever, this trend is perhaps more illusory than real.
7 KRS § 342.004 (1972) (repealed).
8 Id. The language quoted comprised the entire section as originally passed. 1950
Ky. Acts, ch. 187, § 7. In 1972 a second sentence was added which stated: "In any
proceeding for the enforcement of a claim under the law for pneumoconiosis or silico-
sis it is presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the
claim comes within the provisions of the law." 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 78, § 20.
9 E.g., Seventh St. Rd. Tobacco Whse. v. Stilwell, 550 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1976);
Cowden Mfg. Co. v. Fultz, 472 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1971); Tutor Key Coal Co. v. Daniel,
463 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1971); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 447 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1969);
Fayette County Bd. of Educ. v. Phillips, 439 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1969); Oaks v. Beth-
Elkhorn Corp., 438 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1969); Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427
S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1968); Dealer's Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979), disc. rev. denied, 594 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1980). But see Holman Whse. v.
Carter, 536 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1976); Vater v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 511 S.W.2d 671
(Ky. 1974); Princess Mfg. Co. v. Jarrell, 465 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1971); Workman v. Wes-
ley Manor or Methodist Home, 462 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1971); Parks v. Beth-Elkhorn
Corp., 442 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1969); Sowders v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 579 S.W.2d
380 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978).
10 See note 8 supra and accompanying text, which set out the language of the
statute. Note the presumption of validity as to certain claims.
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The repeal of KRS section 342.004 seemingly would indi-
cate that the 1980 General Assembly intended to apply pro-
spectively principles of strict construction to the Act. This
conclusion is bolstered by the Legislature's previously ac-
knowledged concern with high premium rates and its desire to
lower them."' In spite of this "apparent" or "intended" effect,
however, the Act must continue to be liberally construed for
at least two reasons. First, KRS section 446.080(1),12 enacted
in 1892, requires that all Kentucky statutes be liberally con-
strued.1 3 Had the General Assembly intended to authorize
strict construction of the Workers' Compensation Act, it
would have been necessary to exempt the Act (or specific por-
tions of it) from the coverage of KRS section 446.080.14 Sec-
ond, KRS section 342.004, as originally passed in 1950,15
served neither to broaden employees' rights nor to increase
their chances of success on the merits.16 The repeal of that
section, therefore, should neither limit employees' rights nor
decrease their chances of success on the merits. A brief exami-
nation of the history of the provision explains this point.
When the original act was passed in 1916,17 it contained a
provision similar to KRS section 342.004, requiring liberal
construction of the Act. 8 That provision was repealed in
"1 See note 3 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Legislature's
concern with high premium rates.
12 KRS § 446.080(1) (1975) became a part of the statutory scheme through the
enactment of 1892 Ky. Acts, ch. 107, § 15.
13 KRS § 446.080(1) (1975) states: "All statutes of this state shall be liberally
construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legisla-
tion, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed shall not apply to statutes of this state."
H The position of the Kentucky courts on implying an exception to a statute is
stated in Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 67 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1934). "Where the Legisla-
ture has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that
it intended to make none, and it is not the province of a court to introduce an excep-
tion by construction." Id. at 705.
15 1950 Ky. Acts, ch. 187, § 7.
" Segal, An Historical Analysis of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation
Law, 47 Ky. L.J. 281 (1959).
17 1916 Ky. Acts, ch. 33, § 102.
" "Act to be liberally construed. The rule of law requiring strict construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law shall not be applicable to the provisions of
this Act." Carroll's Kentucky Statutes § 4987 (1916).
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
194019 because it was deemed an unnecessary duplication of
KRS section 446.080.20 In spite of this repeal, liberal construc-
tion of the Act continued.2 1 Furthermore, in 1948 the state
Supreme Court decided Yocum Creek Coal Co. v. Jones22 and
explicitly extended the "liberal construction" rule to matters
of evidence. 23 In its next session the Kentucky General As-
sembly passed KRS section 342.004 to negate the holding in
Yocum Creek. Thus, the important language of KRS section
342.004 was "as distinguished from evidence." The section
was intended to prevent liberal construction on matters of ev-
idence, not to extend such a construction to matters of law.24
The requirement for liberal construction of matters of law al-
ready existed.
Due, therefore, to the presence of KRS section 446.080
and to the fact that the Act was liberally construed as to mat-
ters to law even prior to the passage of KRS section 342.004,
the repeal of KRS section 342.004 will not mandate that a
policy of strict construction be followed. Furthermore, it is
conceivable that the purpose of the repeal was to remove the
limitation on Yocum Creek that had been imposed by the pas-
sage of KRS section 342.004. Acceptance of this reasoning
would again permit liberal construction as to evidentiary mat-
ters. This is not to suggest that the Legislature clearly in-
19 1940 Ky. Acts, ch. 191, § 1.
20 Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Ky. 1968).
21 See Hinkel v. Allen-Codell Co., 182 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1944); Pond Creek Collier-
ies Co. v. La Santos, 212 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1948). In Hinkel the Court stated:
It should also be remembered that compensation statutes are to be lib-
erally construed to accomplish the purpose of their enactment which is
nothing less than a direction to courts that if there is any doubt as to a
servant's right to receive compensation under the terms of the statute such
doubt should be resolved in his favor."
182 S.W.2d at 24. In Pond Creek the Court held: "The compensation law should be
liberally construed to carry out its 'humane and beneficent purposes in favor of in-
jured employees."' 212 S.W.2d at 530. See also Lexington Mining Co. v. Richardson,
150 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Ky. 1941).
22 214 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1948).
23 "In view of the policy of broad and liberal construction of the Workmen's
Compensation Law, it devolves upon the Workmen's Compensation Board to con-
strue evidence liberally in favor of claimants in compensation cases." Id. at 412 (em-
phasis added).
24 See note 21 supra for cases demonstrating that the Act was already being lib-
erally construed as to matters of law.
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tended to reapply liberal construction principles to matters of
evidence. One might argue, however, that this is the only logi-
cal conclusion that may be reached in light of the reason for
KRS section 342.004's original enactment and in view of the
fact that the Legislature did not exempt the Act from KRS
section 446.080. Yet the legislators' intent to reduce costs
weighs against this argument.
B. Computation of Benefits
The computation of benefits has been significantly
changed by amendments to KRS sections 342.730 and
342.740.25 The major changes, and their effects, are outlined
below.
1. The Elimination of the Pennington Doctrine 2
Benefits for permanent partial disability have tradition-
ally been calculated by multiplying the percentage of disabil-
ity times a statutory percentage of the claimant's average
weekly wage. This award, however, is subject to a statutory
maximum.28 The maximum award is simply a percentage of
the statewide average weekly wage. 9
The Pennington doctrine deals with the application of
the statutory maximum and can best be explored by examin-
ing hypothetically the facts of Pennington v. Winburn,0 the
case from which it is derived. Assume that the statewide aver-
age weekly wage is $135.01. To establish the statutory maxi-
mum, this figure, prior to the 1980 amendments, was multi-
plied by the percentage provided in KRS section 342.740(1),
which was 60% at the time Pennington was decided. This
21 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, §§ 15-16.
28 This doctrine derives its name from the case of C. E. Pennington Co. v. Win-
burn, 537 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1976).
" KRS § 342.730(1)(a) (1972). This section was amended by 1980 Ky. Acts, ch.
104, § 15.
28 KRS § 342.740(1) (1972). This section was amended by 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104,
§ 16.
29 KRS § 342.740(1) (1972). The statutory maximum is now contained in KRS §
342.730(1) (Supp. 1980). The relevance of this change is discussed in the text.
-0 537 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1976).
1980-81]
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formula yields a figure of $81 (.60 X $135.01 = $81) as the
maximum award. Next, assume that the claimant's average
weekly wage is $314 and that the statutory percentage by
which it is to be multiplied is 621/2 %. This was the percentage
provided in KRS section 342.730(1)(b) at the time Pen-
nington was decided. This equation yields a figure of $196.25
(.625 X $314 - $196.25).
Prior to the case of Pennington v. Winburn, the award
was computed by applying the statutory maximum at this
point in the computation, i.e., before multiplying by the per-
centage of disability, which is the last step in the computa-
tion. Assuming that the percentage of disability is 20%, the
lesser of $81 or $196.25 would be multiplied by 20% to com-
pute the proper award. Thus, the pre-Pennington award
would be $16.20 per week (.20 X $81 = $16.20). The Pen-
nington doctrine led to a different result by applying the st-
tutory maximum ($81) only after the figure derived from KRS
section 342.730(1) ($196.25) was multiplied by the percentage
of disability. This approach would award a claimant the lesser
of $81 or $39.25 per week ($196.25 X .20 = $39.25). The es-
sential difference in the two methods of computation is that
the Pennington approach injects the statutory maximum one
step later in the computation.
The 1980 General Assembly removed the "maximum"
language of KRS section 342.740(1) 31 and, for permanent par-
tial disability, placed it in KRS section 342.730(1)(b).3 2 To de-
termine permanent partial disability benefits for injuries oc-
curring after July 15, 1980, one must multiply the lesser of 66-
2/3 % of the claimant's average weekly wage or 75% of the
statewide average weekly wage times the percentage of disa-
bility.3 3 The "order" of computation is thus fixed by statute,
and the Pennington doctrine has been eliminated.
31 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 16.
" 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 15.
" Note that the "maximum" was increased from 60% of the statewide average
weekly wage to 75% of the state average weekly wage. Furthermore, the pre-Pen-
nington method of computation is now statutorily directed by this provision. KRS §
342.730(1)(b) (Supp. 1980).
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2. Variations in Partial and Total Disability
Prior to the 1980 changes, benefits for permanent partial
disability were calculated in the same manner as were benefits
for permanent total disability. This is no longer true.
KRS section 342.730(1)(a) as amended designates total
disability benefits as the lesser of 662/3 % of the employee's
average weekly wage or 100% of the statewide average weekly
wage. 4 A minimum benefit of 20% of the state average
weekly wage is required for total disability,3 5 and total disabil-
ity benefits continue as long as the disability continues.3 As
mentioned earlier, the statutory maximum for permanent par-
tial disability is based on 75% of the statewide average
weekly wage.3 Prior to revision of the Act, certain permanent
partial disability benefits continued for the duration of the
disability. Under the revised statute, permanent partial disa-
bility benefits will be limited to a maximum of 425 weeks. 8
3. Determining Disability
Previously, an employee's percentage of disability was de-
termined from a schedule of losses contained in KRS section
342.730(1)(c). This schedule of losses, sometimes referred to
as the "price tag" statute, was eliminated.39 A claimant's per-
centage of disability for injuries sustained under the revised
Act is to be determined either by Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment4° or by the percentage of disability
provided by KRS section 342.620(11)," 1 whichever is greater. 2
34 KRS § 342.730(1)(a) (Supp. 1980).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Supp. 1980).
38 Id.
39 KRS § 342.730(1)(c) (1972). This section was amended by 1980 Ky. Acts, ch.
104, § 15(1)(b).
10 The 1977 edition of this American Medical Association publication is to be
used. Copies can be obtained by writing to: Dept. OP-298, AMA, P.O. Box 821,
Monroe, Wisconsin 53566.
41 KRS § 342.620(11) (Supp. 1980) is a definitional statute. It describes "disabil-
ity" as:
[a] decrease of wage earning capacity due to injury or loss of ability to com-
pete to obtain the kind of work the employe is customarily able to do, in
the area where he lives taking into consideration his age, occupation, educa-
1980-81]
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4. Apportionment
KRS section 342.120(5), which relates to the apportion-
ment among the employer, the Special Fund, and the em-
ployee of responsibility for a compensable injury, was also
amended.43 Apportionment is necessary in cases where a
claimant with a pre-existing disability or disease suffers a
compensable injury or occupational disease. It is also neces-
sary in cases where the claimant is found to have a dormant,
non-disabling disease or condition that is aroused by a subse-
quent compensable injury. Responsibility is apportioned
among the parties in the following manner: 1) the employer is
liable for the portion of the injury attributable to a disability
incurred in the course of employment;44 2) the Special Fund,
established by KRS section 342.122,45 is liable for the portion
attributable to a pre-existing dormant condition;4' and 3) the
employee bears responsibility for any portion attributable to a
prior disabling disease or injury.47 The changes made by the
1980 General Assembly in this provision essentially codify the
law as espoused in Transport Motor Express v. Finn"5 and
more recently in River Coal Co. v. Mullins.49 The statute as
revised makes clear that the employee's benefits are to be
determined first and then apportioned, based upon each
party's determined share of liability. This revision eliminates
any confusion that may have existed as to the priority of lia-
bilities in cases where the statutory maximum was in effect. 0
tion, effect upon employe's general health of continuing in the kind of work
he is customarily able to do, and impairment or disfigurement.
Id.
42 KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Supp. 1980).
43 KRS § 342.120(5) (Supp. 1980).
44 KRS § 342.120(3) (Supp. 1980).
45 KRS § 342.122 (Supp. 1980).
46 KRS § 342.120(4) (Supp. 1980).
47 KRS § 342.120(5) (Supp. 1980).
48 574 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1978).
49 594 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1979).
10 Prior to this change an argument was made that the employer's liability must
be met before that of other parties. The following hypothetical is offered to show how
such a finding could affect apportionment:
Suppose the employer and the Special Fund are each 50% liable for the
injury; that 66 2/a % of the employee's average weekly wage is $200; and that
[Vol. 69
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C. KRS Section 342.620(1): The Definition of Injury
Prior to the 1980 revision of the Act, "injury" was defined
as "any work related harmful change in the human organ-
ism. 5 1 In order for a "work related harmful change" to be
classified as an injury after July 15, 1980, it must "arise out of
and in the course of employment. ' 52 The effect of this defini-
tional amendment poses one of the most perplexing problems
raised by the 1980 revisions.
The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" is by no means new to Kentucky workers' compensa-
tion law. A revision of the Act in 1972 appended this phrase
to the definition of "occupational disease," 5 and this phrase
remains a part of the definition of "occupational disease" con-
tained in KRS section 342.620(2).5 Guidelines for determin-
ing whether an "occupational disease" arose "out of and in
the course of employment" are now provided in KRS section
342.620(3). 55 These guidelines, however, refer only to "occupa-
the maximum award is $150. Under the "priority" argument the employer
would be liable for 50% of the $200, or $100, and the Special Fund would
only have to provide the balance between the employer's liability and the
maximum award, or $50. Under the revised statute the employer is liable
for 50% of the benefits the employee is to receive, in this case $75 per week.
The Special Fund must also pay $75 per week.
51 KRS § 342.620(1) (1972). This section was amended by 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104,
§ 13(1).
1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 13(1).
1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 78, § 2(2). "Occupational disease means a disease arising
out of and in the course of employment." KRS § 342.620(2) (1972).
54 KRS § 342.620(2) (Supp. 1980).
55 An occupational disease as defined in this section shall be deemed to
arise out of employment if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the con-
ditions under which the work was performed and the occupational disease,
and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident to the work as
a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and
which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause. The
occupational disease shall be incidental to the character of the business and
not independent of the relationship of employer and employee. An occa-
sional occupational disease need not have been foreseen or expected but,
after its contraction, it must appear to be related to a risk connected with
the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational
consequence.
KRS § 342.630(3) (Supp. 1980).
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tional disease" and not to "injury." The negative implication,
therefore, is that the identical phrase has a somewhat differ-
ent meaning when applied to "injury." The precise meaning of
"arising out of and in the course of employment" as it relates
to "injury" is quite unclear; furthermore, there are few clues
as to how "arising out of and in the course of employment" is
intended to mesh with the previously existing "work related"
requirement of KRS section 342.620(1). Insight into this ques-
tion, however, can perhaps be gained through an examination
of the legislative and judicial history regarding the phrase
"arising out of and in the course of employment."
1. Legislative and Judicial History
Initially, it should be noted that "arising out of and in the
course of employment" was a requirement for benefits under
the Act when originally passed in 1916.8 Less than two years
later, the Workers' Compensation Board decided Phil Hot-
lenbach Co. v. Hollenbach,57 in which it was held that an em-
ployee's death arose out of and in the course of employment
when he was electrocuted while washing up in a company
washroom after work.58 This decision received court affirma-
tion and was the first workers' compensation case to be ap-
pealed in Kentucky. 9 On appeal, the Court examined case law
from other jurisdictions and determined that the words "arise
out of" relate to the cause or source of the injury and that the
words "in the course of" have reference to the time, place and
circumstances of the injury.60 The Court, therefore, found that
these terms were not synonymous and said that recovery must
1916 Ky. Acts, ch. 33, § 3. The statute stated: "Whereas at the time of the
injury, both employer and employe have elected to furnish or accept compensation
under the provisions of this act for a personal injury received by an employe by acci-
dent and arising out of and in the course of his employment." This section was codi-
fied as Carroll's Kentucky Statutes § 4882 (1916).
" The Kentucky Court's review of this decision appears at 204 S.W. 152 (Ky.
1918).
" There was some question as to whether or not a prank may have been in-
volved. An uninsulated wire had been connected to a light socket and possibly at-
tached to the sink. Id. at 154.
89 Id. at 153.
60 Id. at 159-60.
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be denied if either is not satisfied.61 The Court, however,
found that both terms were satisfied and upheld the award.62
The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" ultimately appeared in two sections of the Act, KRS
sections 342.00563 and 342.015.4 Both sections were repealed
by revisions to the Act in 1972. At the same time, as has been
previously noted, the phrase was added to the definition of
"occupational disease, '6 5 while "injury" was defined as a
"work related harmful change in the human organism."66
These definitions remained in force until 1980. During the pe-
riod from 1972 to 1980 the judiciary had an opportunity to
examine the impact of the 1972 revision and to discuss the
relationship between the phrases "work related" and "arising
out of and in the course of employment.16 7 In Seventh Street
Road Warehouse v. Stillwell,6" the Court said:
"1 Id. Hollenbach has been frequently cited for this principle. See People's Ser-
vice Stations, Inc. v. Purvis, 379 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Ky. 1964); Wilke v. Univ. of Louis-
ville, 327 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Ky. 1959); King v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 313
S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1958); Stapleton v. Fork Junction Coal Co., 247 S.W.2d 372, 373
(Ky. 1952); Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Riddle, 190 S.W.2d 1009, 1010
(Ky. 1945).
62 204 S.W. at 162.
63 KRS § 342.005 (1956) was a codification of 1956 Ky. Acts, ch. 77, § 1 and dealt
with the applicability of the Act to various categories of employers and employees.
This statute was repealed by 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 78, § 36.
- 1956 Ky. Acts, ch. 77, § 2, which was codified as KRS § 342.015(1) (1956),
appeared as follows:
Where at the time of the injury both employer and employe have elected to
furnish or accept compensation under the provisions of this Act for a trau-
matic personal injury, received by an employe by accident and arising out
of and in the course of his employment, or for death resulting from such
injury, within two years thereafter, or for disability or death resulting from
occupational disease as defined in this Act, the employer shall be liable to
provide and pay compensation under the provisions of this Act and shall,
except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and in KRS 342.170, be
released from all other liability.
Id. (emphasis added). This section was repealed by 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 78, § 36.
65 1956 Ky. Acts, ch. 77, § 2(2).
68 Id. at § 2(1).
67 Prior to its decision in Seventh Street Road Warehouse v. Stillwell, 550
S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1976), the Kentucky Supreme Court decided two "injury" cases that
provided little guidance on the revision's meaning. See Haycraft v. Corhart Refracto-
ries Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976); Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976).
68 550 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1976).
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It should be noted that the 1972 amendments to the
Workmen's Compensation Act repealed KRS section 342.005
which stated that to be compensable an injury must be trau-
matic, sustained by accident and arise out of and in the
course of employment. Acts of 1972, Chapter 78, sec. 20. Its
successors, KRS 342.620(1) and 342.610(1) merely state that
a compensable injury is any work related harmful change in
the human organism. The purpose of this change in the law
was to expand workmen's compensation coverage to non-
traumatic injuries. It is the injury element and not the em-
ployment element of a workmen's compensation claim that
the legislature meant to expand. "Work related" and "aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment" are synony-
mous terms.69
As Justice Lukowsky pointed out in Stillwell, there are
two elements to a workers' compensation claim: an "injury"
element and an "employment" element.7 0 In the years 1972 to
1980, when the phrase "arising out of and in the course of
employment" was missing from the definition of "injury" in
KRS section 342.620(1), the phrase "work related" thus was
interpreted by the courts to be synonymous with the "arising
out of" phrase and was applied to the "employment ele-
ment.17 1 Justice Lukowsky's interpretation of the 1972 revi-
sion as an expansion of the "injury element" to "non-
traumatic" injuries72 has been followed by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals on at least two occasions since Stillwell.3
Now that both phrases appear concurrently in KRS sec-
tion 342.620(1), interpreting them as synonymous renders one
of the phrases superfluous. Yet, the 1980 amendment certainly
was not intended to narrow the "injury" element of the defini-
tion. Had this been the legislative intent, a "traumatic" or
"accidental" injury would likely have been required. While
the impact of the 1980 amendment is less than clear, it is sug-
gested that the change may have been intended to allay the
"9 Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Dealer's Transp. Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d at 84; Armco Steel Corp. v.
Lyons, 561 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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confusion following the 1972 revision and is therefore nothing
more than a reinforcement of Stillwell.
D. Limitation of Actions
1. Repeal of KRS Section 342.186: Notifying Employee of
Statute of Limitations
KRS section 342.186 required an employer to notify an
employee who was injured or in of the statute of limitations
applicable to the injury or illness at least thirty days prior to
the expiration date. 4 That provision, which became effective
June 21, 1974, 5 was repealed effective July 15, 1980.76 The
repeal of this statute is a significant change in the Workers'
Compensation Act. An examination, however, of the two pub-
lished opinions rendered under the statute reveals a potential
for its application notwithstanding its repeal.
In Lanier v. Commonwealth Fish and Wildlife Division,7
the court of appeals held that "failure to comply with the no-
tice provision of KRS 342.186 bans [sic] the employer from
raising the defense of statute of limitations. . . .In the event
the notice is given late, the statute of limitations will not ex-
pire until 30 days after notice is given."17 8 Shortly before the
Lanier decision, the court of appeals decided Peach v. 21
Brands Distillery,7 9 in which the claimant Peach had suffered
a heart attack in June 1973, prior to the enactment of KRS
section 342.186. The statute became effective in June 1974,
before the statute of limitations had run on Peach's injury.
When Peach filed his claim in July 1976, however, the two
year statute of limitations had run. 0 Peach asserted coverage
of KRS section 342.186, arguing that his claim should not be
7 "An employer shall notify any employee who has received an injury or illness
of the statute of limitations applicable to the injury or illness, not later than thirty
days prior to the expiration date." KRS § 342.186 (1974), repealed by 1980 Ky. Acts,
ch. 104, § 24.
71 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 93, § 1.
71 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 24.
77 605 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
78 Id. at 19.
' 580 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
80 Id. at 236.
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barred by the statute of limitations since he had not received
notice. Although Peach's employer admitted that no notice
had been given, the court, applying the rule of construction
against retroactive application of statutes in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, denied relief. Following the
general rule that "the statute in effect on the date of the in-
jury is controlling," '81 the court in Peach refused to apply KRS
section 342.186 to those claims that had arisen prior to its ef-
fective date.8 2
Lanier and Peach suggest that KRS section 342.186 will
apply to claims that arose between June 21, 1974 and July 15,
1980, in spite of the statute's repeal. Thus, if an employer had
notice of a claim arising during that period and failed to give
the employee timely notice of the statute of limitations, the
employee will have thirty days from the time he actually re-
ceived notice in which to file a claim, regardless of the running
of the statute of limitations.
2. Application for Adjustment of a Claim Upon
Termination of Voluntary Benefits
Changes to KRS section 342.185 appear to have created a
conflict with KRS section 342.270(1). KRS section 342.270(1),
which prescribes the time allowed for filing an application for
adjustment of a claim following the cessation of voluntary
payments, was amended in 1974 to increase the time permit-
ted from one to two years.83 As part of the 1980 amendments
to the Act, KRS section 342.185 was amended to also apply to
"adjustments of claims. 84 Prior to the 1980 amendment, that
statute dealt with "notice of accident" to the employer and to
the filing of a claim for benefits and did have a provision for
tolling the statute of limitations during voluntary payments.
KRS section 342.185 now requires that an application for ad-
justment of a claim be filed within one year following the sus-
pension of voluntary payments or within two years of the acci-
61 Id.
82 Id. at 237.
83 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 191, § 1.
1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 8.
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dent, whichever is later.85 Because KRS section 342.270(1) has
a two year limitation and because KRS section 342.185 now
potentially contains a one year limitation, a conflict arises in-
volving possible dual application of these statutes to a given
situation.
Kentucky case law holds that contradictory statutory pro-
visions are reconciled in favor of the more recent enactment:86
"If the two statutes are repugnant to each other, the later
statute must prevail, as it is the latest expression of the legis-
lative will."'87 In Shultz v. Ohio County,8 8 however, the Court
also recognized:
It is an elementary rule of construction that the repeal of an
existing law by implication is not favored by the courts, and
a legislative enactment will never be interpreted as inferen-
tially repealing a prior statute or part thereof unless the re-
pugnancy is so clear as to admit of no other reasonable con-
struction. This universal rule means that the courts will
construe the acts if possible so that both shall be operative
and effective if that can be done without contradiction or
absurdity. If any part of the existing law can be reconciled
or harmonized with the provisions of the new act, it will not
be deemed as having been repealed. 9
Applying the foregoing rationale, the changes in KRS sec-
tion 342.185 would implicitly repeal the conflicting portions of
KRS section 342.270(1). It should be carefully noted, however,
that the changes in section 342.185 affect only the specific seg-
ment of section 342.270 dealing with adjustment of a claim
after the cessation of voluntary benefits. Though it is not
likely that practitioners will often encounter this conflict, the
problem is significant for those who might fail to realize that
the statute of limitations has been shortened. Failure to make
a timely application would result in loss of the opportunity to
have the claim adjusted.
KRS § 342.185 (Supp. 1980).
" Head v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W. 731 (Ky. 1915).
87 Id. at 733.
11 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1928).
Id. at 704.
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E. KRS Section 342.075: Determining Dependents of a De-
ceased Employee
KRS section 342.075 sets out the criteria that must be
considered in determining who qualifies as a dependent of a
deceased employee.90 Subsection (1)(a) presumes dependency
of a surviving spouse under certain conditions, and that pre-
sumption, where it applies, has been consistently regarded as
conclusive upon the courts and the Workers' Compensation
Board.9 1 The court held as early as 1946 that "the conclusive
presumption of being 'wholly' dependent cannot be defeated
or otherwise contradicted by extraneous testimony in all cases
where the dependent met the provisions of the section of the
statute." 2 Thus, in practice, if a spouse meets the require-
ments for the presumption, he or she is entitled to benefits
even though not actually dependent upon the employee at
all.93
90 Dependents of a deceased employee must qualify under the following
provision:
(1) The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent
upon a deceased employe:
(a) A surviving spouse upon a decedent whom the surviving spouse
had not voluntarily abandoned at the time of the accident, or who having
been abandoned by the decedent has not engaged in such conduct since his
abandonment as would at common law constitute grounds justifying the
abandonment of such wife by her husband or such husband by his wife;
(b) A child or children under the age of sixteen (16) years, or over
sixteen (16) years if incapacitated from wage earning, upon the parent with
whom such child or children are living, or by whom actually supported, or
from whom support is legally required by judgment of a court, at the time
of the accident.
(2) In all other cases the relation of dependency in whole or in part
shall be determined in accordance with the facts of each case existing at the
time of the accident.
(3) No person shall be considered a dependent in any degree unless
he is living in the household of the employe at the time of the accident, or
unless such person bears to the employe the relation of father, mother, hus-
band, or wife, father-in-law or mother-in-law, grandfather or grandmother,
child or grandchild, or brother or sister of the whole or half blood and is
actually dependent.
KRS § 342.075 (Supp. 1980) (italics indicate the revisions made by 1980 Ky. Acts, ch.
104, § 2).
Yocum v. Hylton, 557 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
92 Id. at 220. See also Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 195 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1946).
's See Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., 231 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1950) (abandoned wife con-
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The 1980 revision of the Act, however, added to subsec-
tion (3) of KRS section 342.075 the requirement that any per-
son not living in the household of the employee at the time of
the accident be "actually dependent" upon the employee."' It
appears that the amendment converts the conclusive pre-
sumption of subsection (1)(a) into a rebuttable presumption
of dependency when the surviving spouse is not living in the
household of the employee at the time of the accident.9 5 An
employer, therefore, could avoid liability for benefits by rais-
ing the defense of "no dependency" and by proving that the
surviving spouse did not reside with and was not "actually de-
pendent" upon the deceased employee at the time of the acci-
dent. The amendment to KRS section 342.075, however,
should not affect the conclusive presumption of dependency
in cases where the surviving spouse was residing with the em-
ployee at the time of the accident.9 6
Problems may arise concerning the meaning of the phrase
"actually dependent" in cases where a surviving spouse not
living in the claimant's household earned some income but re-
mained "actually dependent" upon the deceased employee.
Arguably, if the Legislature had intended to require the sur-
viving spouse in such a situation to be "wholly dependent,"
that phrase would have been the one added to subsection (3)
of KRS section 342.075. Thus, construing subsection (3) as ac-
tually worded with the presumption of subsection (1)(a) that
clusively presumed to be wholly dependent on employee even though she was not
actually being supported by him at the time of his accidental death).
94 1980 Ky. Acts, ch. 104, § 2.
11 Note, however, that for the surviving spouse to be entitled to even a rebutta-
ble presumption, he or she must not have voluntarily abandoned the employee. KRS
§ 342.075(1)(a) (Supp. 1980). See Davis v. Mitchell, 98 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1936) (sepa-
ration was voluntary on part of both spouses; wife was therefore determined not to be
a dependent).
96 Furthermore, Yocom v. Hylton, 557 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), should
remain controlling in cases where the spouse was residing with the deceased claimant.
Yocom held that the "wholly dependent" presumption could not be defeated even
though the surviving spouse was employed at the claimant's death. See also Purex
Corp./Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Bryant, 590 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), in which
the court applied the presumption of KRS § 342.075(1)(a) to a claim for permanent
partial disability under KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (1976). Although the claimant's wife
worked full time, she was conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon her
husband.
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a qualified surviving spouse is "wholly dependent" suggests
that a spouse who passes the subsection (3) threshold require-
ment of "actually dependent" also qualifies for the subsection
(1)(a) presumption of "wholly dependent." In practice, the
subsection (3) threshold will involve application to a narrow
group of cases wherein the surviving spouse was not residing
with the deceased employee at the time of the accident but
had neither voluntarily abandoned nor acted in a manner to
justify being abandoned by the employee prior to the acci-
dent. 9 7 Only those select circumstances will trigger the 1980
amendment and will require the surviving spouse to prove ac-
tual dependency in order to maintain the presumption of
"wholly dependent" against an employer's rebuttal.
F. KRS Section 342.150: Lump Sum Payments
Prior to July 15, 1980, lump sum payments of future ben-
efits could be approved by the Board on application of either
party, where it was in the best interest of either party and
certain conditions were met. Under KRS section 342.150 as
amended,98 such lump sum payments will be approved only
when applied for by all parties and only where the Board de-
termines that such payments are in the best interest of all
parties. Since the statute provides that a four percent dis-
count rate is to be used in determining present value,99 the
amendment will probably reduce the frequency of lump sum
payments. This conclusion is inescapable when one considers
that the current prime interest rate fluctuates between fifteen
and twenty percent. It is difficult to envision a lump sum set-
tlement discounted at four percent that would be in the "best
interest" of an insurer. Therefore, except in situations involv-
ing small awards having a disproportionately high administra-
tive cost, insurers will be unlikely to favor lump sum
payments.
17 See KRS § 342.075(1)(a) (Supp. 1980) & KRS § 342.075(3).
98 KRS § 342.150 (Supp. 1980).
99 Id.
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II. CASE LAW CHANGES
A. Holding the Claim in Abeyance During Voluntary
Payments
KRS section 342.270(5) requires the Board to hold an em-
ployee's claim in abeyance while the injured employee is re-
ceiving voluntary payments of the maximum benefits payable
under the Act, unless the employee's claim would thereby be
prejudiced.100 In Chapman v. Payne and Hager, Inc.,0 1 the
provisions of KRS section 342.270(5) were determined to be
mandatory. The court of appeals held that unless there were a
showing of prejudice to the employee's claim, the Board had
no discretion in the matter and was required to hold the claim
in abeyance.1 0 2 Although both the statutory language and the
Chapman opinion seem to leave little room for doubt on this
point, in McLeod Distributing Co. v. Campbell10 3 the court of
appeals declined to apply Chapman.
The requirements of the statute seemed to be met in Mc-
Leod. Campbell, the employee, was receiving voluntary pay-
ments at the maximum rate, and there was apparently no
showing that his claim would be prejudiced by delay in appli-
cation for adjustment.104 The court distinguished Chapman,
however, on the ground that there was no indication that the
employee in Chapman was claiming unpaid benefits, while
Campbell was due thirty-seven weeks of benefits at the time
voluntary payments were commenced.'0 5 By refusing to apply
Chapman to situations where the employee is due past bene-
fits, the court rejected an interpretation of KRS section
100 An application for adjustment of claim shall be held in abeyance by the
board during any period voluntary payments of compensation are being
made under any benefit sections of this chapter to the maximum which the
employe's wages shall entitle him, unless it shall be shown that the prosecu-
tion of the employe's claim would be prejudiced by delay.
KRS § 342.270(5) (1974).
101 565 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
102 Id. at 168.
103 593 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
204 Id. The court noted, however: "Appellee's case is not merely prejudiced, it is
completely stopped which appears to be for no other reason than delay itself." Id. at
103.
... Id.
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342.075(5) that would encourage a responsible party to "fore-
stall any payment of past due monies by undertaking present
payment of the maximum benefits payable."1 6
B. Aggravation or Continuation of Injury Resulting from
Failue to Follow Medical Advice
KRS section 342.035(2) states in part: "No compensation
shall be payable for the death or disability of any employee if
his death is caused, or if and insofar as his disability is aggra-
vated, caused or continued, by an unreasonable failure to sub-
mit to or follow any competent surgical treatment or medical
aid or advice. ' 10 7 In Elmendorf Farms v. Goins,108 where the
employee suffered a fractured wrist, medical complications de-
veloped from the employee's failure to perform prescribed ex-
ercises, and his hand degenerated into a condition of virtual
uselessness.10 9 The Workers' Compensation Board found that
Goins had a twenty percent functional disability that trans-
lated into a fifteen percent occupational disability.110 The
Board noted in its opinion that it would have rated his occu-
pational disability at thirty percent had it not "carved away"
fifteen percent, persumably under KRS section 342.035.111 Al-
though it acknowledged some confusion in the Board's opin-
ion, the court of appeals determined that the Board had
reached a reasonable result. The court found that "the record
[could] easily support either the finding that only half of
Goins' failure to exercise was unreasonable or that any failure
resulted in only half of his present disability.1 12 Either result
was held to be within the Board's province as fact finder. 3
The second portion of the Elmendorf opinion dealt with a
conflict between the mandatory language of KRS section
108 Id.
107 KRS § 342.035(2) (1974).
108 593 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), disc. rev. denied, 594 S.W.2d 273 (Ky.
1980).
109 Id. at 82.
110 Id.
,: Id. at 83.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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342.035(2) and the interpretation of KRS section 342.740(1)114
espoused by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Apache Coal Co.
v. Fuller.1 1 5 The Board in Elmendorf first reduced the award
by applying KRS section 342.035(2) and then applied the
statutory minimum provided in section 342.740(1). This was
the Apache approach. The net result was that the final award
remained as if no reduction had occurred under section
342.035(2), because the statutory minimum exceeded the re-
duced and original awards. Recognizing that this application
of Apache would render KRS section 342.035 a nullity,"" the
court resolved the conflict in the following manner:
The award should be initially computed as if failure to fol-
low medical advice were not a factor. Once the correct figure
is reached it should, following Apache, be raised, if neces-
sary, to the statutory minimum. The figure should then be
proportionately reduced according to the degree to which
the Board has found that the disability was caused, pro-
longed, or aggravated by the conditions set out in KRS sec-
tion 342.035(2).117
The importance of this facet of Elmendorf, however, has been
greatly diminished by new legislation for cases of permanent
partial disability. There is no minimum level of benefits for
permanent partial disability for claims arising after January
114 KRS § 342.740(1) (1974) provided a statutory minimum for permanent par-
tial disability benefits until 1977. The only statutory minimum now appearing in the
Act is contained in KRS § 342.730(1)(a) (Supp. 1980) and applies only to total
disability.
115 541 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976).
1' The Elmendorf opinion indicates that KRS § 342.140(1) (rather than KRS §
342.740(1) as indicated in this survey) is the relevant section. However, this may be a
typographical error. While KRS 342.140(1) was mentioned in the Apache decision,
the opinion primarily dealt with applying the statutory minimum of KRS §
342.740(1) to claims for permanent partial disability.
117 593 S.W.2d at 83. This passage from the opinion and the problem discussed
therein can perhaps best be illustrated by examining the facts presented in Elmen-
dorf. Goins, the claimant, was determined to be 30% disabled, half of which was
attributed to his own neglect under KRS § 342.035. The award that resulted was
$11.13 per week. The statutory minimum was $32 (20% of the statewide average
weekly wage). Apache, as applied to these facts, would require an award of $32 per
week. Elmendorf recognized that this approach nullified KRS § 342.035 and reduced
the statutory minimum ($32) by 50% (the portion of the injury attributed to Goins
under section 342.035). The proper award under this approach is $16.
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1, 1977.11' The Elmendorf technique would be used, however,
in applying the statutory minimum of KRS section
342.730(1)(a) to an appropriate case of total disability if the
employee had, to his detriment, failed to follow medical
advice.
C. Benefits Payable to Dependents Although Claimant
Died from Other Causes Before Approval of Claim
A problem may arise when an employee suffers an injury
that is compensable under the Act but dies from unrelated
causes before his claim is filed or approved. KRS section
342.730(3)119 addresses this issue as follows:
When an employe, who has sustained disability compensable
under this section, and who has filed, or could have timely
filed, a valid claim in his lifetime, dies from causes other
than the injury before the expiration of the compensable pe-
riod specified, the income benefits specified and unpaid at
the individual's death, whether or not accrued or due at his
death, shall be paid, under an award made before or after
such death, for the period specified in this section, to and
for the benefit of the persons within the classes at the time
of death and in the proportions and upon the conditions
specified in this section.12 0
The problem courts have experienced in dealing with con-
tinuation of benefits to dependents arises out of the fact that
total disability benefits (and permanent partial disability ben-
efits prior to the 1980 revision) are limited to the period of
disability. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has interpreted
this provision as requiring a cessation of benefits at death.
This principle was stated in Silvers v. Marley Company2 ' as
recently as 1978: "If compensation is to be paid to dependents
under KRS 342.730(4) 'for the period specified in this section'
and that time is 'during such disability' and the disability
128 1976 Ky. Acts (Ex. Sess.), ch. 26, § 1(b). Mr. Goins' claim arose January 20,
1976. 593 S.W.2d at 83.
11 KRS § 342.730(3) (Supp. 1980).
120 Id. (emphasis added).
12- 566 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. Ct. App.), disc. rev. denied, 585 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1978).
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ceases with death, then so also do the benefits. 122 The widow
of the deceased claimant in Silvers was unsuccessful in con-
vincing the court that the Board's award based upon the life
expectancy of the claimant should be upheld.
In the course of its opinion in Silvers, the court distin-
guished an earlier decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Yocum v. Chapman.1 23 The Court in Yocum affirmed the
Board's award of disability benefits to the deceased claimant's
widow, where the Board had limited the award to 425 weeks.
The Silvers court seized upon this limitation to distinguish
Yocum by stating:
There has been a great deal of time devoted to discussions
in the briefs by both parties of Yocum v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 542 S.W.2d 510 (1976) but that opinion is of little aid in
resolving the specific question of legislative intent, for in
that appeal there was a definite period of disability involved
while in this case, we are requested to provide a period of
disability.124
Amburgey v. Daniel Construction Co., Inc.12 5 appears to
have resolved the Yocum-Silvers disagreement by extending
Yocum and overruling Silvers. The Court upheld an award to
the widow of the claimant in Amburgey for benefits that were
to continue "during [the] widowhood and/or dependency [of
Amburgey's dependents] or the passage of 27.45 years, the lat-
ter being the life expectancy of the decedent, whichever first
occurs."'1 26 The Court pointed out that "[tihe Legislature
would not have used the phrase 'whether or not accrued or
due at his death' in KRS 342.730(4) if they had not antici-
pated payments beyond the death of the claimant.
127
One should note, however, that Amburgey's claim was for
permanent partial disability. Under the 1980 revisions, those
payments are limited to 425 weeks.1 28 Payments to the widow
122 Id. at 768.
123 542 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1976).
124 566 S.W.2d at 769.
125 592 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1979).
126 Id. at 141-42.
127 Id. at 142.
128 KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Supp. 1980).
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after the claimant's death would also be so limited.129 Cases
involving total disability benefits, however, continue to be
controlled by Amburgey.
129 Payments to the widow or other dependent will only continue "for the period
specified in this section" and thus must cease after 425 weeks if the payments are for
a permanent partial diability. KRS § 342.730(3) (Supp. 1980).
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